1: Coon E-5 (1926-1927) 1931 MX3 Rif MX3

623 affairs of the *bone* and the council of the great, composed of councillors who concern themselves with the problems of the *canton* and go together to take part in the tribal council in 646 which the function of the *fifth* is to divide the councillors into preliminary alliances.

The type of government just described is limited to the tribes of Beni Said, Beni Ulichk, Taferait, Temsaman, Beni Tuzin, Gzennaya, Beni Urriaghel, Bokoya, Beni Itteft, Beni Bu Frah, most of Beni Amart (exclusive of the region immediately contiguous with Zarket and Beni Mesduy), and, curiously enough, the Senhajan tribe of Ktama.



MAP 13

619 The following tribes or parts of tribes have the same sort of government, except that the
● 642 village council is lacking, the minor duties accomplished by it in other regions being neglected or else taken over by the council of the great: the Asht Dris of Metalsa; Marnissa, Fenassa, Ulad Azam, Beni Kora, Bu Adl, Khunduktamda, Zrarka, Beni Krama, and Beni Wenjin, from the Eastern Arabophone Senhaja; and all the Western Arabophone Senhaja.

In Targuist is the center of the temporal authority of the marabutic family of Ikhemrijen, who have absolute political control of that tribe, as well as of the northwesterly portion of Beni Mesduy; in Zarket, in the rest of Beni Mesduy, which counts with it, in Beni Hamid, Beni Bu Shibet, Beni Beshir, Beni Berber, Taghsuth, Beni Bu Nsar, Beni Khemmas, Beni Seddath, and Beni Gmil, the same type of government as that described in the previous paragraph obtains except that the Ikhemrijen dictate to the councils what they shall do, and in fact keep the moderators of these bodies practically in vassalage. In these tribes

1: Coon E-5 (1926-1927) 1931 MX3 Rif MX3

the Ikhemrijen forbid warfare and alliances, with a result that, as a natural outlet for bellicose exuberance, brigandage is rife.

In the northwestern part of Beni Amart, in the *canton* of Ijaonen, the power of the Ikhemrijen prevents warfare and alliance; otherwise the government is purely Riffian in type.

In the Ghomara the Arab system of government is employed, with the customary alignment of ḳaids (leaders of tribes), khalifas (leaders of *fifths*), and sheikhs (leaders of *cantons*), excepting that all these officers are under the jurisdiction of a marabutic family of Tetuan.

Metalsa, except Asht Dris, Beni Bu Yahyi, and Beni Sidel and Beni Bu Ifrur of Galiya, employ a hybrid form of government in which there is no village council and the council of the great consists only of two or three men who meet in the market to administer justice for the region near it.

Mtiwa, Mestassa, Beni Bu Yafer, Ait Shisher, Mazuza, Kebdana, Muziet, Rgheiwa, Ain Mediuna, Bab Wendar, Beni Ulid, Branes, and Burda had fallen completely under the Arab system before the time when Abd el Krim attempted to remodel the government. In the eastern section and in Mtiwa and Mestassa the ḳaid was euphemistically called by the Berber term *amghar* (councillor), and in the Senhajan tribes mentioned the sheikh was called *kebir el jama*, or "great one of the congregation."

DUTIES OF THE VILLAGE COUNCIL

The cases tried by this body and the matters it is required to regulate are as follows (the fines listed are only approximate):

Theft of eggs and of poultry. The thief must pay a fine of thirty dollars. If the culprit is a child, his father appears and pays it.

Theft of maize. Boys who steal early ripening maize are collectively fined five dollars. The injured farmer has the right to pick ripened ears from the terraces of the thieves' parents to the number which he has lost.

Cutting maize in adjoining terraces. Sometimes maize growing in adjoining terraces, owned by different men, ripens at different times. The owner of the later ripening maize may wish to prevent the owner of the other field from cutting his crop until both are ready, through fear that his own maize may be trampled in the process. This situation arises when it is necessary to enter one terrace by passing through the other. In this case the village council enjoins the owner of the early maize to wait until the other is ready.

Breaking branches of fruit trees. If goats or children break branches from a fruit tree, the owner of the tree brings the branch or branches to the mosque, where the village council counts the number of buds on the branch or branches. A *girch* (about five cents) is charged for each bud, the recompense to be paid the owner of the tree, and in addition a fine of twenty dollars must be paid.

Trampling vegetable gardens. This offense is punished by a fine of one to two dollars, with no restitution.

Policing orchards. During the harvest season the members of this body police the orchards of the *bons* during the night to prevent thefts.

Starting the grape picking. The village council, which has charge of allotting poor families to rich ones for the grape picking, exacts a fine of twenty dollars from anyone guilty of picking grapes before the signal is given.

623 find in the institutions themselves is also found in their names and in those of their representatives.....Very seldom, however, could a single representative impose his own will, and the will was collectively that of the representatives of the dharfiqin. Each representative had a compact group of men behind him to back him up in his decisions, and for this reason the Rifian governmental system was in reality an oligarchic one.[94] Hence the importance of the iziddjifen, which has not diminished even in Spanish times (1935), as the present-day mqaddim, or village headman, is a decorative figure and a confidant of the tribal qa'id, if not a plaything of the iziddjifen, or indeed their servant. It is not rare for interventors (Spanish tribal administrators) to see, on their arrival at a jma'th a representation of this fact, with the men in file and the mqaddim at their head. So far, so good; but this external apparatus is nothing but a masquerade. There is no more than an absurd[95] functionary, the mqaddim, to whom no one pays attention save for a half dozen friends, relatives and the poor, who have only collected together under threats; but it is far more difficult to find the iziddjifen, who continue to meet in their habitual place or do their best to hide in their houses only to reappear after the representatives of the Makhzin (i.e. the interventor and his mkhaznis) have left, in order to smell out the bad news brought by the latter and to look for ways to annul it!

623 621 571 793 The aziddjif or amghar (pl. imgharen), the fqih, the aquwwan and the amarras, or storehouse guardian, are the proper functionaries or notables in a jma'th, an admirable economic organization[96], the administration of which does not cost its members a single cent, for

616 (social), for a man only goes to his liff when the other two types fail him. Thus we see individuals or groups, when they are helpless, calling for their liffs in defense of their rights or taking refuge with them when, conquered or routed, they abandon their own hearths.

61 621 Tribes and their clans, and jma'ths and their kin groups or dharfiqin are generally divided into two balanced, symmetrical and mutually hostile parties; and it is in such an equilibrium that we find the strength of each group, no matter how insignificant that group may appear, and the weakness of the whole tribe, which is only welded together if threatened from outside.

616 619 621 623 In essence, in the tribe of the Aith Waryaghar, the innumerable feuds between jma'ths are reduced to two parties, within each council, whose quarrel, perhaps rather than for hegemony, is a dispute of interests. But, in discussing parties, let us rid ourselves of the 642 795 notions which these have for Europeans, either in forms of government or in religion. In such simple questions, Republic[28] and Islam have been in agreement for a long time. The Rifian states were religious republics governed by laymen, we might say. Well and good: above and 616 beyond these quarrels and ferocious feuds, the Aith Waryaghar knew how to ally themselves, absolutely independently of these, to other groups, indicating that the motive forces which underlay each class of alli- 619 ance were different[29]. Thus we see, for example, how the five khmas (sing. khums) of the Aith Waryaghar were allied or opposed to each other, and how they constituted two mutually hostile bands; the Aith 'Adhiya, Aith 'Ari and Aith 'Abd Allah on one side, and the rest on the other[30]. In my opinion, these two bands represent the most obvious

000 FOOTNOTES:

(114) 1--This should no doubt read, "by iziddjifen or imgharen".

2--We have not heard of any instance in which a tribal fine is divided
(682) up in this manner. Normally, when a man is fined for murder, for instance, the fine is split up into as many equal parts as there are clans in the tribe, after which each clan distributes its share of the fine among its component subclans, and so on down the line.

3--For an excellent and virtually contemporary account of what could happen at an agraw, see Coon, op. cit., 1931, p. 97, and Coon, Flesh of the Wild Ox, New York: Morrow, 1932, pp. 77-83. Coon's account is taken from the Igzinnayen, who pronounce the word ayraw.

(628) 4--This is indeed an excellent example, but Blanco does not say why:
(114) because the other Rifian tribes through which Bushta al-Baghdadi's army passed did their own share of pillaging the Ibuqquyen as well--and this was particularly true of the lowlanders of the Aith Waryaghar.

5--The term harka did not exist in the Rif prior to 'Abd al-Krim, and under his aegis the notion it implied reached its fullest flowering, through military (i.e. "regular" Rifian Army, a total of some 2500 men under the command of 'Abd al-Krim's younger brother Si Mhammad n Si 'Abd l-Krim) and ordinary tribal levies sent out to fight, first, the Spaniards on two fronts (east and west) and then the French on one (south). These contingents, both regular and irregular, were organized into groups of twelve, twenty-five, fifty, one hundred and three hundred men (the last mentioned constituting a tabur), each one of which was under a qa'id designated by the number of men under his command--qa'id at-tn'ash (of 12), qa'id l-khamsa w 'ashrin (of 25), qa'id l-khamsin (of 50), qa'id l-Miya (of 100), and qa'id attabur (of a tabur, or 300).
(177) However, the idea of the harka had been there previously, even if the organizational refinements set up by 'Abd al-Krim, who modeled them on those of the Sultan's Army, were new.

6--In actual fact, those imgharen already holding office merely became war leaders as well.

(602) 7--This statement does not quite jibe with the notion of conscription, above; but the principle was exactly the same as that of a powerful chief who could count on armed support from numerous lineage-mates and/or fellow clansmen.

8--This comparison is couched by Blanco in the form of a recommendation for the use of native harkas in Spanish service.

(114) 9--This is certainly true of the Targist and the Thafarsith, but not of the Aith Wurishik, who are a fairly powerful tribe in their own right.

10--In the original, todo el mundillo rifeño, which is fully as descriptive, and a good deal less pompous, than "conceptual universe", for example.

616 11--Berber society always seems to be labeled "republican", "democratic",
619 "anarchic", "oligarchic", etc. etc., and as I have remarked in several
642 previous notes, Blanco is a prime offender in this regard. Even though
114

616 619 642 114 the Rifians borrowed a European word, republik, to describe the political organization of their country before 'Abd al-Krim's time, and even though they say that they employed this word because there was no central government, no makhzin, only imgharen or councilmembers acting in a state of "organized acephaly", we must not assume, for instance, that republik to a Rifian means what republic means to an American or republique to a Frenchman. Furthermore, though the American and French definitions of the term are no doubt closer to each other than either or both of them are to the Rifian, we cannot even assume that they are the same. And one of Blanco's most persistent defects in his analysis of social structure is a constant tendency to try to put square pegs into round holes.

616 619 182 60 829 [171] 12--Blanco's comparison of a jajgu to a branch of a tree (which, in fact, it actually means) and of dharfiqth to the trunk, e.g. a branch of a lineage with the lineage itself, is a comparison that Rifians themselves very frequently make. An anthropologist beginning work in the area, is always told by his informants, if he is perplexed by the intricacies of segmentary systems, to compare a tribe with a tree: trunk, major branches, minor branches growing out of these, still smaller branches, and, finally, leaves. The notion of "family trees" is just as firmly rooted in tribal Islam as in the Western World, perhaps more so.

000 13--What Blanco refers to in this very European expression is, among other things, attendance at the noon prayer on Fridays in the mosque.

[114] [171] 14--Where Montagne committed a grave error was in his assumption that Rifian alliances work exactly the same way as the checkerboard system which he found in the Western Atlas, and of which, oddly enough, the almost hypothetical Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs in Northern Morocco also seem to have been a good example. Blanco did not fall into quite the same error, but like Montagne, he takes the Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs at their face value, and accepts them entirely.

15--In the original, bando, which is not a bad description. The liffs of a given tribe are, in fact, hostile moieties, and regarding this conceptualization of them, and the notion of balance, equilibrium and oscillation between them, see Hart, op. cit., 1958, pp. 204-6, note 44.

[614] 16--The notion that there can be more than two liffs within a clan or within a tribe may not, in fact, be beyond the realm of possibility; but the point is academic, for the end result is, no matter how one arrives at it, always two liffs. For example, clans A and B are at war, while C, D and E remain neutral. C and D, however, are hostile to each other, so that if A should ask C's aid, D will automatically join B. After this, ideally, E will split in half, one half joining A's liff and the other, B's, in order to keep the balance and symmetry complete.

17--Almost always, in the shifting liffs within clans, each liff took the name of its most powerful man; and sometimes this happened on the tribal level as well, though it was less frequent.

616 621 602 114 18--The concept of linkage is basic to an understanding of the functioning of Rifian liffs, as Blanco indicates. He does not, however, go

have just said, a personage who does not show up in any qanun as discharging his office or as even providing the most minimal and non-transcendent representation, for in the one qanun in which we finally discover him (the qanun commented upon here) we have already shown that he hides himself modestly and even effacingly behind the camouflage of two other shiyukh. The result is that not even in the big list, in the listing of "the fat ones" (i.e. the enumeration of the clan brothers of each of the imagharen of importance), does this ambitious man gain first prize, the individual who seizes this being an opulent and lay tribesman whose preeminence clearly gives a clue to the psychology of the talib who drafted the qanun as well as to that of his constituents.

And, reflecting upon bases like these, it is well to ask what reasons or exigencies the first protectorate functionaries felt, discounting both imitative and ignorant ones in order to orient their policies toward big qa'ids who, even if their stature has been diminished, are no longer to be seen for sure anywhere.

To impose upon the tribes more or less significant personalities, representatives of concentrated power, when, subdivided ad infinitum, they unite in their opposition to all types of personal power, is always an ungrateful undertaking and one full of surprises, as practice has shown us....when power is imposed from above.[84]

In the Rif, where all are personalities, only a mass-oriented political system, and not one oriented toward individuals, can bear fruit.[85] The enforced utilization of one or even several dozen persons of some importance serves no purpose if this does not benefit the mass, taking up its aspirations and satisfying its needs, anxious for freedom

R 642 and justice, and so opposed to sharifian and Qur'anic feudalism in theory and practice.....

S 671 9. QANUN OF THE TRIBE OF AITH SIDDAT[86]:

A) Qanun:

S 619 681 Praise be to God. The tribe of Bani Siddat convened to agree that (Blanco: note a) whoever should commit a murder in the above-mentioned tribe shall pay 500 duros, (Blanco: note b) but in case several (individuals should be involved in the commission) of the crime, each one shall pay the above quantity of 500 duros; (Blanco: note c) that, if a thief should penetrate the house of someone and be killed by the owner of the house, there shall be no way in which proceedings can be brought against the latter except if there should previously have existed some matter (of disagreement) between both, in which case (the abovementioned owner) shall have no recourse other than to make good what was established in the agreement; (Blanco: note d) any individual, in case he should attack someone, although the attack be frustrated, and in spite of the fact that he be repulsed and killed, shall pay what has been agreed upon, (Blanco: note e) and against the one who repulsed him there shall be no way in which proceedings can be brought; (Blanco: note f) whoever (should fire) a shot shall be fined one-fourth of the amount agreed upon above, and (Blanco: note g) whoever inflicts a wound shall be fined one-half; (Blanco: note h) whoever should attack with stones or wound his fellow man (literally, "brother") shall be fined 50 mithqals and 1 duro in the coinage of Makhzin; (Blanco: note i) whoever should insult a woman with obscene and dishonest words shall be fined 50 mithqals and 1 duro

121 related to subsistence are dictated by a different order of
556 practical considerations and ideological commitments than
433 obtain as the dominating factors in industrial society.

121 It has been an on-going dispute in anthropological
114 literature about whether such an economy as that of the Rif
433 is susceptible to the same sort of treatment that marks the study of market-oriented, industrial society. Polanyi began the dispute by pointing out that the rules of choice upon which most economic theory rests are based on a particular social and economic model which has only limited applicability. He noted that the economic behavior of the participants of an industrial society was largely induced by the institution of the market. The difficulty in such economic analysis comes, of course, when we study societies in which the market is not the primary focal point of the economy.

121 In Rif society the marketplace is peripheral to the
433 economy. This condition is due in part to historical and
443 ecological factors which have influenced the evolution of a particular kind of social organization in which each local community has grown inwardly dependent on its own social and economic resources. The Rif has, until recently, been part
121 433 of the bled-as-siba, or the land outside the administrative
642 control of the Moroccan government. Thus, one of the major social factors in the history of the Rif was the absence of centralized political authority. This lack of a political factor in integrating the economy has directly influenced the

121 system by which resources are distributed. In the absence of
433 such a factor, the economy developed as a reflection of the
642 social organization wherein well-being depended on relatives, friends, the good-will of the spirits and God, all supporting one another.

121 The data upon which this study is based were collected
[126] from two villages in adjoining tribes in the Central Rif. The economy of individual families within the villages was studied, as well as how these local communities articulate with each other and with the wider Moroccan social and economic structure. The principal foci of the investigation were the reciprocal relations between kinsmen and neighbors, the relation of property to prestige, ritual obligations and magical predilection, and the general effects of the indigenous system of social relations on the consumption and distribution of resources.

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

a tower used as a lookout and blockhouse.[9] Conflict was most serious in the Rif, where it was necessary to establish a system of women's markets so that the members of feuding cantons or tribes could carry on a rudimentary trade. Another indication of the varying degrees of dissidence is the scale of fines imposed by customary law. The fine imposed for murder by the Aith Wariyaghar was four times as large as the fine for the same crime among the more pacific Sanhajan tribes.[10] In the laws of the Aith Seddath there is no mention of house-burning, a frequent occurrence in the Rif.

In the days before the European occupation the division between government and dissidence coincided with a division between authoritarian order and representative councils. This division might be described also as a contrast between Arab and Berber systems of government. The Berber system was based upon superimposed councils. The smallest was the council of a village or a number of scattered farmsteads. The second council, called the "council of the great," had jurisdiction over a canton. At least one and sometimes all members of the second council participated in the deliberations of a tribal council. The system was democratic, with rotation of authority; thus no one could gain excessive power. The Arab system was and is quite different, for authority rests with individuals, from the *qaid* who rules the tribe to the *shaikh* or *muqaddam* who rules the village or hamlet.

Of the many ceremonies that influence an individual's life, marriage is by far the most important. Here again there are marked differences from one area to another. In the Rif the wedding celebration lasts seven days; on the first four days, private feasts are held for the families involved; on the last three days, guests are invited to the feasts. In Jbala, Ghmara, and most of Sanhaja as-Srair the wedding celebration lasts only three nights. Other differences appear in the entertainment offered to the guests and the complicated rules that govern the behavior of the bride and groom.[11]

The other crises in the life of an individual—naming, the first haircut, and circumcision—vary correspondingly, as do the procedures related to death and burial. When a corpse is ready for burial in the Rif, it is carried on the door of the local mosque, and virtually the whole community turns out for the procession and funeral. In the Arabized sector of northern Morocco the body is usually carried by paid pallbearers, and only the immediate family may attend the burial. Among the Aith Bu Yihyi and Ulad Stut it is standard practice to carry the dead to the burial place on the back of a donkey or mule.[12]

The number of material traits that can be used as a basis for cultural differentiation is almost unlimited. Containers of skin and iron in Garet contrast with pottery in the Rif, and wooden vessels in Sanhaja as-Srair. Even within the Rif one may distinguish the handmade pottery in Igzinnayen, Aith Ammarth,

[9] Most of the towers were removed in 1922 by order of Abd al-Krim. D. M. Hart, "An Ethnographic Survey of the Riffian Tribe of Aith Wuryaghil," *Tamuda*, Revista de Investigaciones Marroquíes, 2 (1954), 38.

[10] For further information on customary law in the Rif, see E. Blanco Izaga, *El Rif: la ley rifeña* (Ceuta: Imprenta Imperio, 1939), pp. 71–75.

[11] Edward Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1914).

[12] C. S. Coon, "Tribes of the Rif," *Harvard African Studies*, 9 (1931), 143–145.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 9 1

/240 cont./

628 But in these less wild regions, the periods of calm are never-
182 theless short and do not leave these rudimentary institutions
642 /241/ time to perfect themselves. Anarchy and fights by fam-
ilies infuriated by vengeances have never permitted the Riffians
to know a government by regularly elected leaders, changed in
628 turn, or the use of common funds. Only the holy-war treasuries,
652 organized by pious establishments, existed at all times. Hate
721 for the Christian can indeed dominate the strongest feelings;
798 whatever may be the violence of the disputes that divide them,
182 the notables always agree enough to go shares in small sums of
money intended for the purchase of bullets in order to go to aim
at the detested soldiers of the "Peñon" /Rock/ of Alhucemas or
Badès (1).

[113] 1. Compare A. Bernard, Les Confins algéro-marocains /The Algero-Moroccan Borders/, p. 89 and sqq.

000 XII. The republics of the Kabylie /Kabylia/. -- It is above all between the social organization of the Kabylie /Kabylia/ before the French conquest and that of the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ that it is possible to multiply the comparisons in order to find profound analogies under the apparent differences. It is easy, as a matter of fact, to see that the small republics of the Tichka or of the Jbel Kest, sequestered in the high valleys of the South of Morocco, and the ones that have grown and prospered on the summits of the Djurjura live with similar institutions, share the same positive and limited ideal, suffer from identical ills, and are subject to the same rules of existence, to the same laws of development.

The territory of the "ᶜarch" is, as we have seen, equivalent to that of a small "taqbilt" of the Sous; both form, in the free state, autonomous and often even independent political units. But in one of the regions the slight density of the population of a country where human life is difficult, in the other the